The Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) Intelligence Wing, Tiger Organization Security
Intelligence Service (TOSIS).
The author would
like to dedicate this article to Colonel Tuan Nizam Muthaliff RWP, MI (July 12, 1966 - May 31, 2005) was
the former Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion Military Intelligence Corps,
Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) of Sri Lanka, whose perseverance and courage in the face of adversity has served as
an inspiration.
Unclassified
Introduction
“Secret operations are essential in war, upon
them the army relies to make its every move. ... An army without secret agents
is exactly like a man without eyes or ears.”
Sun Tzu – ‘The Art of War’
It
has been said by many that in order to fight a war the most basic and important
asset is that of a secret service or organization especially dedicated to
intelligence gathering operations. It may be a government agency, the military
or the police. This is also relevant to
a non-state actor or a terrorist group.
The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, as a guerrilla-terrorist organization
fighting to establish a separate homeland for the minority Tamil population in
Sri Lanka, staged about 250 suicide operations since July 1987 until the
present day. All these have been within Sri Lanka, with the exception of the
assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by Thenmozhi
Rajaratnam, alias Dhanu, on 21st of May 1991. With a few exceptions,
the LTTE claimed responsibility only for the suicide attack operations it
conducted against military targets in Sri Lanka's north-eastern region. The organization refrained from claiming
responsibility for operations against VIP and non-military infrastructure
targets, since all such missions and/or operations were carried out by its
Intelligence Wing. Attributable to this
Intelligence Wing’s operations is the LTTE’s labelling as a “terrorist outfit”
rather than a “liberation movement” by the USA, Canada, the EU and India.
Even though
the Terms of Engagements and/or the Rules of Engagements differ from a conventional
force, a terrorist network’s secret missions and/or operations are still
conducted in a well organized and professional manner nowadays. As I had no
choice but to work for the Intelligence Wing of the LTTE, I experienced how a
terrorist “cell” is structured and operates. My understanding is that they were
not well structured to begin with but after incurring heavy losses of their
sources such as agents and informants who were identified and arrested by the
Sri Lankan security forces, the LTTE organization realized that it should
establish a professional intelligence unit.
Since they
didn’t have the resources that a government intelligence agency would have,
they mostly tended to rely on Human Intelligence only, rather than more
sophisticated Signal Intelligence, Electronic Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Technical
Intelligence, etc. In order to train their cadres, the organization
acquired books, magazines, films/movies and training manuals from foreign
countries to learn about the world’s famous intelligence agencies such as the
Gestapo of Germany, the KGB of Soviet Union, the CIA of America, MI5 and MI6 of
Britain, the SDECE/DGSE of France, Savak and Vevak of Iran, Mossad and Shin Bet
of Israel, RAW of India and ISI of Pakistan. For instance, LTTE’s Intelligence
Wing somehow managed to acquire an original copy of the training manuals
belonging to Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), the Pakistani internal and
external intelligence agency.
They also
brought in mercenaries to train their most senior cadres who had the necessary
linguistic skills; later those senior cadres trained the rest of the
Intelligence Wing cadres in the organization.
LTTE Intelligence Dominance
In the region of Indian subcontinent, LTTE had the
dubious distinction of having been a sort of pioneer in terrorism. Some of its
ground-breaking achievements were the suicide vest/belt, suicide vehicle
bombing and the elimination of leaders using suicide commando raids, all of
which the Taliban and al-Qaeda have imitated. The think-tank behind all these
terrorist groups’ operations, including the LTTE’s, was the Pakistan
military-backed Inter Service Intelligence (ISI). As an insider of the LTTE’s
Intelligence Wing, I’m very well aware that after the assassination of Rajiv
Gandhi by the LTTE, the ISI cunningly exploited the opportunity to use LTTE to
systematically destabilize India from the South where it’s strategic hard
targets are located. Since then, the ISI began covertly aiding the LTTE with
intelligence trainings and tactics. For instance, most of the intelligence
training I underwent in 1993, including intelligence gathering, intelligence
analysis and agent recruitment, handling and exploitation with Mathavan Master
of the LTTE Intelligence Wing, was based on the original ISI agent handling and
exploitation model.
In May 1993,
following the assassination of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa that was led and handled by Janan Master of
the LTTE Intelligence Wing, Pirbakharan and his Intelligence Chief, Pottu
Amman, decided to send Janan Master to Tamil Nadu to act as liaison between the
LTTE Intelligence Wing’s “political activities and liaison division” and the
pro-LTTE political party leaders in Tamil Nadu, such as V.Gopalaswamy, President of the
Marumalardchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhakam (MDMK), Dr. S. Ramadoss, the
founder-leader of Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), Pazha Nedumaaran, President of
the Tamil Nationalist Movement (TMM), K. Veeramani, President of Dravidar
Kazhagam (DK), and Thol.Thirumavalavan, President of the Viduthalai
Chiruthaigal Kadchchi (VCK). Pirbakharan wanted to understand the mindset of
the Tamil Nadu politicians towards his organization and had hoped to ignite the
Tamil nationalism induced by the politicians by placing a high-level LTTE
liaison in their midst.
There was also another reason behind sending Janan Master to Tamil Nadu.
In the aftermath of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India’s external
intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), waged a massive
covert operation against LTTE under the direction and advice of Prof.
V. Suryanarayan. Due to LTTE's excellent counter-intelligence unit led by Kapil
Amman and including Janan Master, this mission was a huge disaster and
embarrassment for India. The LTTE mounted surveillance on all of RAW's rings
inside their controlled area, arrested all the agents, spies and the cadres who
were involved and eventually dismantled the entire operation.
The LTTE as a template for terrorism
In 1995, I was given a video tape by Pirbakharan’s
military advisor, Thinesh Master, and was asked to identify what type of an
aircraft had been shot down by an LTTE missile so that they could provide the
technical details of the particular aircraft to the LTTE-controlled newspapers.
On the tape, I saw a few men with long beards and wearing turbans, giving
demonstrations to LTTE cadres in Jaffna on how to shoot down the Avro HS-748
transport aircraft with shoulder-fired surface-to-air Stinger missiles. I was
curious and asked Thinesh Master who the men were. He replied that they were
Afghan Mujahedeen.
According to Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Defence,
intelligence experts have long suspected the existence of connections between
the LTTE and other internationally designated terrorist organizations,
including al-Qaeda and the Taliban. These connections came under more detailed
scrutiny as a result of 9/11 attacks.
Some of the incidents cited to prove these suspicions include:
§
The similarities between previous LTTE attacks against Sri Lanka Navy
ships and the al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US Navy
sailors.
§
Evidence that the LTTE provided forged passports to Ramzi Yousef, the man
who carried out the first attack against the World Trade Centre in New York in
1993.
§
The smuggling of weapons by the LTTE from Islamists in Pakistan to
their counterparts in the Philippines.
§
Allegations that
the LTTE stole Norwegian passports and sold them to the al-Qaeda organization
to earn money to fund their arms purchases.
§ Increasing intelligence reports that the LTTE was
smuggling arms to various terrorist organizations using their covert smuggling
networks and findings by the London-based International Institute for Strategic
Studies that they were building commercial links with al-Qaeda and other
militants in Afghanistan.
Other security experts, including Glen Jenvey, have also claimed that
al-Qaeda has copied most of its terror tactics from the LTTE. He highlighted
the LTTE as the mastermind that sets the pattern for organizations like
al-Qaeda to pursue. Some of the comparisons he used to draw his conclusions
are:
§
The LTTE invented the modern suicide bomber and deployed it against
political, military, and civilian targets. Islamic groups copied the LTTE by
carrying out similar suicide attacks.
§
The LTTE attack on the World Trade Centre in Sri Lanka was followed by attacks
by al-Qaeda on the World Trade Centre in New York.
§
The LTTE's use of a women's section has being copied by al-Qaeda and
Chechen terrorists, for example the "Black Widows" who played a role
in the Moscow theatre hostage crisis and have carried out suicide bombings.
§
Attacks on civilians in buses and trains in Sri Lanka are similar to the
al-Qaeda attacks on public civilian transport during the July 2005 bombings in
London.
In
this context it is vital to analyze the LTTE’s Intelligence Wing, also known as
“The Tiger Organization Security Intelligence Service” (TOSIS) in detail. The TOSIS was reportedly founded at the end
of the 1980s when the LTTE was fighting with the Indian Peace Keeping Force
(IPKF). It functioned as the prime intelligence service of the LTTE until 1993,
when it was divided into two sub-units, the “National Intelligence
Service”, and the “Military Intelligence Service”. The latter did not have
cadres on the ground in hostile areas but it had agents in the Sri Lankan
security forces. The presence of a second intelligence service gave the LTTE
the advantage of cross-checking and verifying both raw data and assessments.
National Intelligence Service
( Thesiya Pulanaivu Pirivu)
Although
the LTTE was trained by India’s RAW in the early 1980s, the LTTE’s National
Intelligence Service’s strategic operating structure and tactics were more
similar to the Mossad of the 1980s, except for its agent handling model. The
number of personnel engaged in both Mossad and the LTTE are about 1500.
Furthermore, the Mossad’s operating language is Hebrew and one of the reasons
LTTE’s Intelligence Wing is successful is that they function entirely in Tamil.
The LTTE-Mossad nexus was further corroborated
when ex-Mossad officer Victor Ostrovsky’s book “By Way of Deception” was published in September 1990.
There are 5 known departments to the National Intelligence Service:
Collections
Department: (Thakaval Sekatippu Pirivu) headed by the deputy Kapil Amman. This was the largest
department, with the responsibilities of agent handling and espionage
operations and with sub-divisions in the northern, eastern and southern parts
of Sri Lanka. This body also coordinated with the LTTE’s police force in the
areas they controlled. The department consisted of a number of desks which were
responsible for specific areas such as,
§ Counter-Espionage
Operations
§ Political
Activities and Liaison Division
§ Interrogation
and Detention Center
Research
and Publications Department: (Aaivu
Mattrum Veliyeeddu Pirivu) headed by Mathavan
Master and responsible for intelligence production, including daily
situation reports, weekly summaries and detailed monthly reports. This
Department was organized into number of categorically specialized sections such
as,
§ Planning
and Operations
Special
Operations Division: (Ellalan Padai)
headed by Janan Master, also the
Principal Agent Handler of the LTTE Intelligence Wing. The “Black Tigers” - a
highly secretive suicide squadron – were also attached to this division under the
direct command of the LTTE leader. This secretive squadron conducted highly
sensitive operations such as
§ Paramilitary
Operations
§ Psychological
Warfare Projects
§ Propaganda
and Deception Operations
Training
and Technology Department: (Payitchi
Mattrum Tholilnudpa Pirivu), also headed by Mathavan Master, responsible for the training and development of
advanced technologies for support of both National and Military intelligence,
including the suicide vest/belt, modifying weapons and explosive-filled
vehicles, spy tools, etc.
Administration
and Records: (Nirvaakam Mattrum Arikkai
Pirivu) headed by Sankar. This
body particularly focused on administration, personnel, finance, transport and
welfare.
Military Intelligence Service,
(Iranuva Pulanaivu Pirivu)
Headed
by Sasikumar Master
The
Military Intelligence Service of LTTE was formed in 1993, almost 10 years after
the LTTE had established their primary National Intelligence Service, in order
to keep the military-related operations compartmentalized. There was a
“Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol” (LRRP) team operating under the LTTE’s
military wing, known as Viseda Vevu Pitivu,
that played a key role in assassinating Sri Lankan Army General Denzil
Kobbekaduwa and ten other high rank army officers with him. LRRP cadres
infiltrated and laid an anti-tank mine in a military complex in the northern
part of the Island. The LRRP’s Sasikumar Master was praised for the victory and then appointed as the head of the
newly-formed Military Intelligence Service.
The
Military Intelligence Service was relatively small and operated on a lower
scale compared to the National Intelligence Wing. It only focused on gathering
intelligence on Sri Lankan security forces. Even though the operations were
highly compartmentalized, the Military Intelligence Wing nonetheless relied on
the National Intelligence Wing for their training and advanced technologies.
There were 4 known departments to the Military Intelligence Service:
Collections
Department on Sri Lanka Army: (Iranuva
Thakaval Sekarippu Pirivu) headed
by Kowthaman.
This
body exclusively gathered intelligence on SL Army bases, artillery units,
armoured core, heavy weapons, infantry vehicles and high ranking officers and
their families. They studied in detail the entire Army’s Order of Battle
(ORBAT) structure, knowing each division and divisional commanders, each
brigade and brigade commanders and each regiment and regimental commanders up
to the company, platoon and section level officers and then locating where they
had been deployed in real time.
This
detailed intelligence gathering helped them to know the exact strength of each
army base located anywhere in the country. For instance, LTTE had been gathering
intelligence on a northern army complex called “Pooneryn Military Complex” for
almost two years before they successfully raided the complex in November 1993.
They monitored army communication transmissions and sent their LRRP team to
infiltrate and gather real-time intelligence. Then they made an exact model of
the complex and knew the exact strength of the army, each officer’s name and
the location of the artilleries and the armoured vehicles.
A model was even made of the driving compartment of the Czech-made T55 main
battle tank that SL Army had in that base; two of them were eventually seized.
Collections
Department on Sri Lanka Navy: (Kadatpadai
Thakaval Sekarippu Pirivu)
Responsible
for gathering intelligence on Sri Lankan naval bases, harbours, naval vessels
and personnel. Since LTTE operated from an island, it depended largely on the
sophisticated amphibious group known as the “Sea Tigers” for logistic support.
Their duty was to take control of the north and east territorial waters of Sri Lanka
and to support the special “Exclusive Economic Zone Marine Logistics Support
Team” (EEZ-MLST) of the Sea Tigers.
It
was therefore this body that coordinated with the Sea Tigers in order to gather
intelligence on the SL Naval bases and vessels. It also collaborated with the
special “Underwater Demolition Teams” (UDT) of
the Sea Tigers who infiltrated the harbours and gathered maritime intelligence.
On the other hand, acquiring the “Jane’s
Naval Fighting Ships” catalogue made it easy to build models of each and
every class of the Sri Lanka Navy fighting ships/gun boats. The EEZ-MLST’s
sophisticated maritime surveillance radar systems, Global Positioning Systems
(GPS) and the dual-purpose special binoculars known as the “Steiner” helped to
keep surveillance on daily naval patrolling.
Collections
Department on Sri Lanka Air Force: (Vaanpadai
Thakaval Sekarippu Pirivu)
Responsible
for gathering intelligence on Sri Lankan Air Force bases, aircrafts,
helicopters and personnel. To make the
task easy, this body coordinated with the LRRP team and the special “Sky
Tigers” of the LTTE. The LRRP team infiltrated and gathered intelligence on the
Air Force bases, runways, signal stations, hangers, oil storages and personnel.
Afterwards, the contemporary intelligence was used to make models of the Air
Force bases. Meanwhile, by gathering data from “Jane’s Fighter Planes” this body worked with the “Sky Tigers” unit
to make models of Air Force fighter planes and helicopters.
The
final intelligence products were given to the decision makers who planned,
prepared and executed special raids, using highly-trained suicide commando
units.
Administration
and Records: (Nirvaakam Mattrum Arikkai
Pirivu).
As
in the National Intelligence Service, this sub-division particularly focused on
the administration, personnel, finance, transport and welfare of the Military
Intelligence Service.
LTTE
Intelligence Training Centre (Pulnaivu
Payitchi Maiyam)
Headed by Mathavan
Master.
"I have a high regard for the LTTE for its discipline, dedication,
determination, motivation and technical expertise... I was left with the
impression that the LTTE was the expression of popular Tamil sentiment and
could not be destroyed, so long as that sentiment remained......"
Lieutenant General S.C. Sardesh Pande, IPKF
Divisional Commander, Jaffna in his book "Assignment
Jaffna"
1.
Recruiting Informants and Public Relations.
2.
Tradecraft and Skills.
3.
Intelligence Gathering.
4.
Intelligence Analysis, Assessment and Exploitation.
Recruiting
Informants and Public Relations
As
intelligence gathering is by its very nature a difficult task of utmost
importance, the organization was extremely cautious when recruiting their
agents and informants. Most of the time they tended to cultivate personnel from
the same ethnic nationalist group as themselves who also had the potential to
access enemy targets. Great emphasis was therefore placed on public relations
among their own people. They necessarily went through an extensive background
check of all the individuals they hired, in the process focusing on the
individual’s profile, character, vulnerabilities and motivation to assess if
he/she was the right person for the job as well as on the factors that made
that particular person want to work for them.
An
inadequate administration, poor management, discrimination, ignorance and
oppression by a government sometimes can drive its own people to support a
terrorist organization. This makes the organization’s job easier as they can
take advantage of this opportunity to hire more informants and agents from
within the target group. For instance, a
few political parties that represent minority groups in southern Sri Lanka were
continuously discriminated against and ignored by successive ruling parties.
This neglect ensured the LTTE success when it invited the leaders of these
political parties (Vaasudeva Nanayakara and Aarumugam Thondaman) who were then
Members of the Sri Lankan Parliament and indoctrinated them to work for LTTE’s
Intelligence Service as long-term resident agents.
Recruits
had to go through a special training period to acquire the skills to perform
their tasks and to learn specific techniques in the trade of espionage. This is
called Tradecraft and could include such specialties as Agent Handling, Covert
Communication, Counter-Interrogation, Reconnaissance, Coding and Decoding,
Drawing Maps, Photography, Martial Arts, Linguistic Skills, Driving Skills,
Swimming Skills and so on, depending on the task the agents/informants were
assigned to. Once
a recruit went through the tradecraft and skill training period, the handlers
made an assessment of each recruit, keeping the individual’s potential and
background in mind, to confirm whether he/she was fit to be an agent.
Before
spies and informants were assigned to a mission they were instructed in every
single detail of the target. The target could be a harbour, airport, refinery,
warship, aircraft or even a VIP - whatever it might be, the handlers would
brief every single thing that they already knew about it in detail and then
debrief for the information they need. Informants had to learn about the
specific physical environment in detail beforehand so that they could easily
provide updates on selected targets. In order to make this task easier the
organization preferred to hire government
employees working in the area, selecting them carefully after identifying and
confirming their potential usefulness.
For
instance, LTTE Intelligence Wing hired a retired government employee who worked
as a panel board controller in Sri Lanka’s largest refinery. They first
assigned him to teach a group of Intelligence Wing cadres everything about a
refinery from crude oil tanks to petrol tanks - the whole process of refining,
storing, distributing petrol and then the structure of a refinery as well.
Later, they asked him to pay a visit to Colombo where he had colleagues and
friends who were still working in the same refinery. While visiting his friends
at the refinery he was able to collect the plans of the buildings, maps, the
latest technological developments, security measures, storage tanks and its
locations. He was just asked to mail in the information.
Similarly,
LTTE Intelligence hired an informant who was working in China Bay Air Force
Base in Trincomalie as a leading aircraft man. He had
been visiting his family, living in LTTE’s controlled area, and was forced to
work for its Intelligence Wing. Since
then, whenever he was visiting he was asked to provide the latest developments,
security measures and maps for the Air Force Base.
While
the LTTE was gathering intelligence on Colombo Harbour, they hired an
Engineering student who was studying Marine Engineering on a scholarship at
Mahapola Institute, part of the Colombo Port Authority. A student from a poor
family, it was very easy to motivate him by money. As he had access to the
entire container terminal and mechanisms, he was able to provide the latest
developments, maps, locations and security measures.
Intelligence
Analysis, Assessment and Exploitation
Once
all the intelligence was gathered it had to be centralized in the Data Bank.
The Principal Agent Handler (PAH) was in charge of the Data Bank. He was
provided with thousands of situational briefing reports every day from various
sources: Intelligence Wing cadres (spies) who operated from all parts of the
country, the government employees (informants) across the country, military
communication and transmission monitoring teams, special reconnaissance teams
(LRRP), FDL (border) patrolling and open source intelligence (OSINT) all
reported back to the PAH.
The
PAH and his team consisted of an
Agent Handler, a Deputy Agent Handler and more than a dozen Principal Agents.
All these agents worked together on analyzing, assessing and exploiting the
intelligence they gathered and submitted the final intelligence product to the
decision makers in order to take full advantage of any information that had
come to hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes. Whether the
decision makers took any action or not, the Principal Agent Handler and his
staff always did an assessment on a weekly basis to facilitate the Data Bank.
The
most successful part of intelligence gathering depends on the security and
covert communication that an organization provides to its sources. As without
security there’s no intelligence, it is of utmost importance that an
organization protect its human assets. This can only be done if there is a systematic
way for intelligence to flow from hostile areas to the organization’s data
bank. It was also the Principal Agent Handler’s responsibility to make sure
that his sources were safe and secure.
The
PAH directed the Agent Handler, Deputy Agent Handler and Principal Agents
within the organization’s controlled areas, who worked from inside offices and
therefore were known as “Desk Agents”. There was another set of agents also
directed by PAH who worked in the field (hostile area) controlled by the enemy and
therefore were known as “Field Agents”. There was always a middle man who
worked as a “contact” or go between Desk Agents and Field Agents, known as the
Intermediary or Cut-Out.
In
the hostile area there were well-established agents working for the PAH known
as Resident Agents (RA), who organized and directed compartmentalized “cells”
operating there. Each Resident Agent dealt with a maximum of 4-5 Agents (A, B,
C, D, and E) who were cultivated or hired and trained by those Desk Agents. As they worked under a considerable amount of
risk, they were proactively given a cover story and a back- up to ensure their
security. For instance, a well-known
journalist living in the hostile area, sending and receiving information from
all parts of the country, would have the perfect cover story to be a Resident
Agent. A marine engineer working in a harbour would have a perfect cover story
to be a source of information.
When
a Resident Agent (RA) contacted one of his agents and/or informants in order to
exchange information he had to be extremely careful not to expose or compromise
them to anyone, even to each other. He would meet with them in different Safe
Houses and afterwards the
Intermediary would meet the Resident Agent in a separate Safe House and pass
the information on further to the Desk Agents.
In
special cases an Agent might contact the PAH directly without going through the
Resident Agent and/or the Intermediary. In such instances, the Agent would use
covert communications and code sheets to pass the information. These kinds of
cells were not only used in order to pass information but also to transfer
other resources such as weapons and personnel.
For
example, when LTTE’s Intelligence Wing planned an attack on Colombo Harbour,
they began by acquiring a blueprint of the area. In order to achieve this, they
identified a harbour employee by confirming his potential, mind-set, motivation
and risk assessment, then hired him for the job of Agent/Informant. This
Agent/Informant was instructed to contact the Resident Agent (RA) on a regular
basis and provide contemporary intelligence. An Intermediary would contact the
Resident Agent to obtain the information to pass on to the Principal Agent, or
mailed the information in segments directly to him.
They
also hired another agent, working, for example, as an engineer at the harbour,
to provide technical information such as storage, oil tanks, container
terminals, warehouses, ammunition depots and so on. He provided the information to the Resident
Agent or when he was travelling between government controlled area and LTTE’s
controlled area, he gave the information directly to the Principal Agent or
even Principal Agent Handler, acting as an Intermediary himself.
In
the meanwhile, the Data Bank provided information to the Intelligence Wing for
building a model of the harbour and another cell was engaged to transfer
weapons and personnel to the government controlled area, using the same process
of agent handling.
Finally
the attack squad was trained and briefed about the plan and sent to the
location using another route. Since this
was an attack on a harbour,
the assault team and weapons were moved to the location by a sea route.
For
this mission, if a Black Tiger suicide bomber was required who had been cultivated
as “sleeper” to use long-term, he or she were also contacted by the Principal
Agent Handler to brief the plan and were provided weapons and resources through
yet another cell. The Principal Agent Handler did not, under any circumstance,
expose or compromise the sleeper to the rest of the cells or vice versa, in
order to ensure everyone’s security.
To
quote from Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessments, “...the LTTE was a highly innovative force capable of
retaliation against aggression, reprisals and pre-emptive strikes. Regular
features of the LTTE
doctrine included the unleashing of widespread terror on soft targets.
Concentrating on lightly or unprotected targets is a classic diversionary
tactic in warfare, pinning down troops to static sentry or bunker duties and
restraining search and destruction operations. The LTTE had specialized in
surprise raids - many of them suicide bombings. Prime ministers and presidents
were killed, high-security army, navy and air force headquarters infiltrated,
passenger planes at the international airport destroyed and the country's many
economic infrastructures, including the Central Bank, blown up. The LTTE bombed
Sri Lankan passenger ships, commercial aircrafts, trains and buses; gunned down
priests, nuns, pilgrims and bystanders in a sacred royal city and shot Muslims
while worshipping in mosques; frequently raided non-Tamil border villages and
towns, massacring men, women and children; and land mined, ambushed and
assaulted military and police patrols and posts in Sri Lanka....”
The
LTTE Intelligence Wing threatened not only the domestic stability of Sri Lanka
and India but also, by its example, the security of the regional and global
system as a whole.
Mao Tse Tung said that
guerrillas are like fish in an ocean of people. The LTTE “fish” brilliantly
exploited how to make use of the “ocean” of the general populace. Since every
LTTE Intelligence Wing cadre was Sri Lankan of Tamil origin, unfortunately the
whole Tamil society in Sri Lanka came under suspicion. In an effort to detect
and disrupt potential attacks, the Sri Lankan security forces established
extreme security measures, including check points, cordon and search
operations, abductions, detention camps, aggressive interrogation,
disappearances, harassment and humiliation. Tamil
men and women are still being treated in this way on a daily basis because they
could possibly be former LTTE Intelligence Wing cadres. These counter measures
of the Sri Lankan Security Forces in turn justify criticism that Tamils are not granted basic
human rights within their own homeland.
- Agent: a person
who is hired by an intelligence agency or security service, to act in their
interest.
- Back Up: a support
or backing information of an under cover operative, for the purpose of
substantiating his/her cover story. It’s also known as Backstop.
- Compartmentalization:
management of an intelligence service so that information about the personnel,
organization or activities of one component is made available to any other
component, only to the extent required for the performance of assigned duties.
- Cover Story:
a persona, profession, purpose, activity, fictitious image maintained by an
agent or undercover operative.
- Dead-Letter Box (DLB): a
physical location where communications, documents, and/or equipments are
covertly placed for another person to collect, without direct contact between
the parties. It’s also known as a Dead-Drop.
- Electronic Intelligence (ELINT):
information derived by intercepting and studying electromagnetic radiation from
non-communication sources, such as radar
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT): intelligence collected by humans.
- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT): an intelligence gathering
discipline which collects information via satellite and aerial photography.
- Informant:
a member of a target group, who provides intelligence to the surveillance team
or organization
Intermediary: a contact or go-between used to
preserve the safety or
anonymity of the Principal and Resident Agents, also known as Cut-Out.
- Live-Letter Box (LLB):
an address used to receive communication to be forwarded to an Agent and/or
Intelligence Agency. It’s also known as a Mail-Drop.
- Mole: a spy who
works for an enemy nation, but whose loyalty truly lies within his nation's
government.
- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT):
an information processing discipline that involves finding, selecting, and
acquiring information from publicly available sources and analyzing it to
produce actionable intelligence.
- Principal Agent:
an agent who, under the direction of the principal agent handler, is
responsible for the operational activities of other agents.
- Resident Agent:
the head of a legal or illegal residency in the hostile nation who supervises
subordinate intelligence personnel.
- Safe House:
a dwelling place or hideout unknown to the adversary.
- Signal Intelligence (SIGINT):
intelligence-gathering by interception of signals, whether between people
(i.e., COMINT or communications intelligence) or between machines (i.e., ELINT
or electronic intelligence), or mixtures of the two.
- Sleeper: an
inactive under cover agent, who is cultivated for long term use.
- Technical
Intelligence (TECHINT):
intelligence about weapons and equipment used by the armed forces of enemy
nations, often referred to as foreign material.
- Tradecraft:
specialized techniques used in intelligence operations.
